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Resumen 
En este trabajo exploramos si las firmas tienen un objetivo para el número de bancos con los cuales 
deciden endeudarse, y si la presencia múltiples acreedores afecta su liquidez. La fusión de los 
bancos Santander y Santiago constituye un shock externo al número de acreedores para las firmas 
que mantenían deuda con ambas instituciones al momento de la fusión. En este estudio encontramos 
que una fracción significativa de las firmas que sufrieron una reducción en el número de acreedores 
por efecto de la fusión, vuelve al número original de bancos con los que trabajaba antes de la fusión. 
En particular, la probabilidad de agregar un nuevo acreedor en los cinco años que siguen a la fusión 
es 23% mayor para las firmas cuyo número de bancos disminuye de dos a uno como resultado de la 
fusión, comparada con la probabilidad de agregar un nuevo acreedor para firmas similares cuyo 
número de bancos no fue afectado por la fusión. Adicionalmente, encontramos que una reducción 
en el número de bancos a consecuencia de dicha fusión reduce el acceso al crédito para las firmas 
afectadas. En particular, pasar de dos relaciones bancarias a una genera, en promedio, una reducción 
de 14.4% en el monto total prestado a estas empresas comparado con el monto prestado a empresas 
similares que no fueron afectadas por la fusión.  
 
Abstract  
We empirically explore whether firms have a target for the number of banks from which they 
borrow, and whether having multiple bank relationships has an impact on firms’ liquidity situation. 
A bank merger in Chile provides a quasi-experiment as it constitutes an exogenous reduction in the 
number of lenders for firms that were previously borrowing from both merging banks. We find that 
a significant percentage of firms whose number of bank relationships was reduced by the merger 
regain their original number of lenders. In particular, firms whose number of bank lending 
relationships was reduced from two to one as a result of the merger have a 23% higher probability 
of adding a new bank lending relationship in the five years following the merger than similar firms 
unaffected by the merger. Overall, we find that a reduction in firms’ number of bank lenders 
resulting from the merger reduced firms’ access to credit. In particular, a reduction from two to one 
bank lending relationships generated, on average, a 14.4% decrease in loan size for the affected 
companies compared to firms unaffected by the merger. 
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1 Introduction
Borrowing from multiple banks is common practice among firms. Most new firms begin
by borrowing from a single bank, but soon add new bank lending relationships. Farinha
and Santos (2002) show that in Portugal 28% of firms have more than one bank lending
relationships after two years of operations, and 35% of the firms have more than two bank
lending relationships four years after startup.
In a frictionless market, as proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1958), the number
of bank lending relationships a firm uses will have no impact on its value or the funds
available to it. However, there are multiple potential frictions, such as commitment prob-
lems, information asymmetries and transaction costs that can make a firm’s number of
bank lending relationships affect its liquidity situation. There is ample theoretical work
that studies these frictions (see Rajan (1992), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), and Thakor
(1996)). However, the literature is far from providing a unanimous prediction as to how
the number of lenders affects firm liquidity, as different models yield different implica-
tions. Furthermore, the empirical literature has been unable to satisfactorily corroborate
the importance of these frictions because sample selection, endogeneity and unobservable
variable biases pose serious challenges to empirical inference.
This paper attempts to address these problems by studying an exogenous shock to the
number of bank lending relationships that occurred in Chile during 2002 and unexpectedly
reduced the number of bank lenders for some firms. This is the first study that uses an
exogenous source of variation to identify the effect of the number of lenders on firms’
liquidity constraints. This paper focuses on two central questions: (1) Do firms set targets
for their number of bank relationships? (2) Does the number of bank relationships a firm
establishes impact the amount of credit that the firm can access?
Turning to the first question - whether firms have specific targets for their number
of bank relationships - if the number of lending relationships a firm establishes affects
costs and/or access to credit, we should observe firms adjusting their number of lenders to
minimize costs and maximize credit availability. However, if these frictions are unimportant
we should observe that firms do not seek a specific number of bank lending relationships.
We find evidence that strongly suggests that firms have targets for their number of bank
relationships. In fact, we observe that a significant percentage of firms who saw their
number of bank relationships reduced by the merger return to their pre-merger number of
lenders. For example, the firms whose number of banks was reduced from two to one have
a 23.2% higher likelihood of adding a new lending relationship compared to similar firms
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unaffected by the merger.1
Secondly, we study whether having multiple bank relationships has an impact on the
firm’s liquidity situation. We find that on average the decrease in the number of lenders
reduced the total loan size of firms affected by the shock. For example, a reduction from
two to one bank lending relationship on average generated a 14.4% decrease in total loans
to the affected companies, as compared to similar companies unaffected by the merger.
These results were obtained by studying a natural-experiment generated by the merger
of two major banks in Chile during 2002, which was a (minor) consequence of the merger
of two financial conglomerates in Spain that each owned significant stakes in the two
Chilean banks. As the Chilean banks made up less than 1% of the value of the Spanish
conglomerates it is reasonable to assume that the merger of the Spanish conglomerates was
not driven by the desire to merge their Chilean financial holdings. In turn, this makes it
plausible that the reduction in bank relationships caused by the merger was an exogenous
shock for firms with relationships with both banks before the merger.
The treatment group in this quasi-experiment is composed of firms that were borrowing
from both of the merging banks prior to the merger, while the control group is composed of
firms that were borrowing from banks that did not merge.2 After the merger, the companies
in the treatment group had only one bank lending relationship, while firms in the control
group still had two bank lending relationships. We use a difference-in-difference approach
to estimate the change in the probability of adding new bank lending relationships after
the merger, and to estimate the effect of the merger on credit availability.
The data for this study is from the database of the Bureau for Bank Regulation in Chile
(SBIF). This database contains financial information on the three million individuals and
firms that have debt in the formal Chilean financial system. From this database, we
constructed a panel with the financial information on the 6,000 firms included in the
treatment group and the 13,000 firms in the control group. This panel contains yearly
information for the period 1998-2006.
The results in this paper strongly suggest that firms have specific targets for the number
of banks they wish to borrow from. In the five years following the merger, firms whose
number of lenders were reduced by the merger had on average a 18.7% higher probability
of adding a new bank lending relationship compared to similar firms unaffected by the
1Within 5 years of the merger.
2To make the control and treatment groups comparable, we exclude from the sample firms receiving
credit from a government owned bank, and firms receiving loans from a bank that was less than 50% of
the size of the target.
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merger. This effect is strongest for firms whose number of banks were reduced from two to
one; these firms have a 23.2% higher probability of adding a new bank lending relationship
in the five years following the merger, compared to similar firms unaffected by the merger.
The effect decreases as the number of bank relationships per firm increases, as can be seen
in the table below. This diminishing effect is not surprising, since we expect that the effect
of the merger should be strongest for firms that have less outside financing options.
Firms whose number of
banks was reduced from 2 to 1 from 3 to 2 from 4 to 3 average (all)
Increased probability
of adding a banking
relationship compared to 23.2% 18.8% 14.1% 18.7%
firms unaffected by the merger
We also find that the probability of adding a new bank lending relationships in the five
years following the merger does not depend on loan size (the effect ranges from 16.41%
to 17.17% and the differences are not statistically significant). However, firms in the fifth
loan size quintile add new bank relationships more quickly than firms in the remaining loan
quintiles. Within two years of the merger, firms in the fifth loan quintile already have a
14.6% higher likelihood of adding new bank lending relationships compared to similar firms
unaffected by the merger. Firms in the remaining loan quintiles have only a 9.3% higher
probability of adding new bank lending relationships in the same time frame. This suggests
that it is easier for firms in the fifth loan quintile to add new bank lending relationships,
probably because they experience weaker asymmetric information problems.
The analysis of this quasi experiment also suggests that the decrease in the number of
lenders generates a reduction in the availability of credit. In particular, firms whose number
of lenders was reduced from two to one as a result of the merger experience a reduction of
14.5% in their total loan amount, as compared to similar firms unaffected by the merger.
We also find that firms try to offset this reduced access to credit by establishing new bank
lending relationships. However, even with these additional banking partners, most firms
are not able to fully offset the reduction in credit availability. A potential explanation is
that adverse selection makes it difficult for firms to start new bank lending relationships
and when firms are able to establish new relationships, the new lending partners may only
be willing to lend a fraction of what the original lender was willing to lend. While large
firms with many bank lending relationships before the merger are able to fully offset the
reduction in access to credit, small firms cannot, even if they had multiple lenders before
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the merger. This suggests that adverse selection can reduce firms’ access to credit, even
in the context of pre-existing bank relationships.
One explanation for the significant reduction in the availability of credit for firms
affected by the merger is that the newly merged bank decided to diversify its portfolio
post-merger, believing itself to be over-exposed to certain clients. However, the average
loan size (even after the merger) is negligible compared to the total assets of the bank.
Nonetheless, such a diversification explanation is still plausible if there are agency problems
between the bank and its loan officers. Since loan officers are usually paid according to
the size and default rate of their portfolio, and given that their portfolio is a fraction of
the bank’s total portfolio, loan officers may have incentives to over-diversify.
A second mechanism, modeled by Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), is that an increase in
the number of lenders may complicate firm renegotiation in the event of financial distress:
if firms anticipate a difficult renegotiation process this may deter them from strategically
defaulting on the loan. This can help explain our finding that a reduction in the number of
lenders reduces access to credit. According to the Bolton and Scharfstein model a reduction
in the number of lenders will increase the probability of a successful loan renegotiation. If
firms anticipate lower renegotiation costs they may engage in more risky projects, which
in turn will increase the default rate. Furthermore, even if firms do not engage in riskier
projects they may have incentives to strategically default in order to renegotiate the terms
of the loan. Cutting loan sizes could be the bank’s reaction to firms’ increased incentives
to engage in risk shifting in their investment decisions and to strategically default.
A third explanation is provided by Thakor (1996). In his model, the bank observes the
quality of the firms with noise, so good firms risk of being taken as poorly performing clients
and being denied credit. If the noise in the screening process is not perfectly correlated
amongst banks then increasing the number of lending relationships should reduce the risk
of being mistakenly identified as a poorly performing client.
A potential concern with the methodology used in this paper is that the results could
be driven by changes in the post-merger lending policy of the merged banks. To address
this concern, we perform a difference-in-difference analysis for firms with a single lending
relationship with one of the merged banks, relative to a comparison group of firms that
had a single bank lending relationship with a bank outside of the merger. If our findings
in the quasi-experiment were driven by changes in the lending policy of the merged bank,
the findings should also hold in the estimation for firms with single bank relationships. To
test if our findings were driven by policy changes we test whether (1) firms with a single
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lending relationship with one of the merged banks are more likely to add new bank lending
relationship after the merger, compared to firms with a single lending relationship from a
bank that did not merge; and (2) whether firms with a single lending relationship with one
of the merging banks experience a reduction in their total loan amount compared to firms
with single lending relationships that were unaffected by the merger. We find that firms
with a single bank lending relationship with one of the merged banks were 2% less likely to
add a new bank lending relationship within the year that follows the merger compared to
firms having single lending relationships with banks that did not merge. This result is in
the opposite direction to the effect for firms that were borrowing from both merging banks
pre-merger, providing further evidence that firms that see their number of lenders reduced
by the merger add new bank lending relationships because they have specific targets for
their number of lenders, and not because they face a change in the lending policy of the
merged bank. Second, we find that the loan size is 2.9% smaller for firms borrowing from
one of the merging banks compared to the loan size of firms borrowing from a bank that
did not merge. However this reduction in the availability of credit is five times smaller than
the reduction for firms that were borrowing from both merging banks pre-merger. This
result shows that a potential change in the policy of the merged bank does not explain
the reduction in the loan amount, and supports the hypothesis advanced here that the
reduction in loan size is a result of the decrease in the number of lenders.
In short, this robustness check provides grounds for confidence that the results of the
quasi-experiment are due to a change in the number of bank relationships and not the
result of a changed post-merger lending policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of
related work, Section 3 details the methodology, Section 4 presents the data and summary
statistics, Section 5 presents results, Section 6 presents a robustness check and Section 7
concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Theoretical Literature
There is ample theoretical literature that explores the relationship between firm liquidity
constraints and the number of banks they employ. In this section, we present the most
relevant theoretical models that study how the number of lending banks firms employ
impact the availability of funds, the probability of defaulting on loan payments and the
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probability of successfully renegotiating loans.
Rajan (1992) develops a model where firms choose between informed lenders and arm’s-
length investors. The benefit of borrowing from informed lenders is that they will closely
monitor the firm, make informed lending decision and give advice on the investment deci-
sions of the firm. Lending will be more flexible, in the sense that the lender will adapt the
loan to the needs of the firms. The cost of borrowing from informed lenders is that they
can extract rents from the firm, because the bank gains monopoly power by having infor-
mation about the firms that is difficult to obtain by competitor banks. On the other hand,
arm’s length lending mitigates the rent extraction problem, but is less likely to monitor
or control the investments and adapt the loan to the needs of the firm. In Rajan’s frame-
work, firms with a single“informed” lender will have a more flexible access to finance and
therefore less inefficient default than firms that engage in “arm’s length” lending. Rajan’s
model suggests that the most important reason to engage in multiple lending is to reduce
the capacity of the informed lender to extract present and future rents. Nonetheless, Von
Thadden (1995) shows that rent extraction can also be mitigated by long term contracting
with a single bank. This suggest that firms should have other reasons to lend from multiple
lenders beyond mitigating rent extraction. The findings in our work indeed suggest that
firms chose to engage in multiple bank lending relations for diverse reasons.
Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) and Scharfstein and Bolton (1996) model the renegoti-
ation problems associated with widespread debt holding. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991)
argue that renegotiation problems arise due to coordination problems among bondholders.
More specifically, debt holders who do not renegotiate can see the value of their bonds rise
if the rest of the bondholders forgive some of the debt. This can lead some bond holders to
hold out from renegotiation, causing a breakdown in the process. Scharfstein and Bolton
(1996) argue that the costs at which the creditors can sell the firm’s assets, in the event of
a liquidation, increases with the number of lenders. This increase in the liquidation value
reduces the incentives for strategic default, but also increases the probability of inefficient
liquidation in the event of liquidity defaults. The higher risk of inefficient liquidation
present in these models may deter firms from strategically defaulting, thus reducing de-
fault rate. In turn, the decrease in the probability of strategic default may increase the
loan size that banks are willing to lend ex ante.
Thakor (1996) focuses on the effect of capital requirement on aggregate bank lending.
To answer this question he models the firm’s choice about the number of lenders they seek
when they need a bank loan. Thakor (1996) assumes that banks will screen firms with noise,
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therefore creditworthy firms will prefer applying to more banks to reduce the probability
of being denied credit. However applying to more banks will reduce the incentives for
banks to screen, because the higher competition will reduce the likelihood of being able
to extract the firm’s rent in the future. The companies will therefore have an optimal
number of banks to apply that balances this two effects. Even though Thakor focuses on
the number of banks a firm applies to, it is easy to extend his model to the number of
banks a firm borrows from. Indeed if we think that banks will decide on the loan size
based on noisy screening (instead of deciding between lending or not lending) then a firm
may want to borrow from multiple lenders to improve their liquidity situation.
2.2 Empirical Studies
Gilson, Kose and Lang (1990) find that having more debt owed to banks, and less distinct
classes of debt bond holders, increases the probability of a private renegotiation success.
However, Asquit, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) find that the fraction of public debt does
not have a significant effect on renegotiation success. Rather, they find that the number
of times the firm issues debt (which they use as a proxy of debt complexity) is associated
with renegotiation success. Although these papers disagree as to what causes renegotiation
complications, they come to the same conclusion that more widespread lending is associated
with a lower probability for renegotiation success.
In more recent empirical work, Brunner Krahmen and Pieter (2007) investigate the
effect that multiple lending has on renegotiation success by studying bank pools, an insti-
tution that coordinates the action of banks during debt reorganization, in Germany. Brun-
ner Krahmen and Pieter find that the probability for successful renegotiation is higher and
time spent in default is shorter when distressed firms have fewer bank lending relations.
They also show that pool formation is more likely when the debt is evenly distributed
among banks, suggesting that even distribution facilitates coordination.
The previous three papers discuss the implication of having multiple lenders on renego-
tiation. As discussed in the theory section Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) predict that the
potential renegotiation complication will have implications on the lending decisions of the
banks. In the rest of this section we briefly describe the papers that study the relationship
between number of lenders and liquidity.
Petersen and Rajan (1994), use a data set on small businesses in the United States
to explore the benefits of relational lending. They find that concentrated borrowing is
correlated with greater availability of credit. They also find that adding one additional
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banking partner increases late payments by almost two percentage points. However, they
find little evidence that the price of loans changes when lending is more concentrated. In
our study, we also explore the extent to which concentrated borrowing affect the total
outstanding loan and the probability of default.
An empirical work closely related to our study is Farinha and Santos (2002). Using a
data set on Portuguese firms, they explore the factors that lead companies to switch from
one bank relationship to multiple banking relations. They argue there are two principal
reasons why a firm would wish to increase its number of banking partners. First, a firm
may wish to expand banking relations if they have had rapid growth and one bank can
no longer meet their financial demands. It also follows that firms that have better growth
opportunities may be inclined to using multiple banks. Second, companies with a low indi-
cation of profitability, or that are in arrears, may expand their bank relations to continue
to receive financing.
While the aforementioned empirical studies set forth a strong framework from which
to study the impact of multiple banking, a common problem among the literature is that
firms endogenously select their number of banking partners (or bond financing). This
problem is not fully addressed in the former papers and therefore the interpretation of the
results is challenging. In our work, we use an exogenous shock to isolate the effect that
the number of lenders has on multiple banking from the inherent characteristics that lead
firms to select different debt structures.
3 Methodology
The majority of empirical studies that examine the impact that multiple banking has on
firms are challenged by the fact that firms internally decide their quantity of banking
partners. We use a quasi-experiment that provides an exogenous reduction to the number
of lenders some firms use. This allows us to identify the effect of the number of lenders in
the liquidity situation of the firm.
The quasi-experiment we study was a result of the merger of two major banks in Chile
in August 2002. The merger generated an exogenous reduction in the number of banks
for firms that previously borrowed from both of the merged banks. The merger was a
result of the union of two financial holdings in Spain, Banco Santander and Banco Central
Hispano, that merged into Banco Santander Central Hispano (BSCH). Banco Santander
was also the owner of Banco Santander Chile, while Banco Central Hispano had a 40%
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participation in Banco de Santiago. In April 2002 BSCH bought 35% of Banco de Santiago
raising its participation from 40% to 75%. Banco Santander Chile and Banco de Santiago
merged their operations in August 2002, after the Chilean antitrust bureau declared that
the merger was not a threat for the competition in the Chilean financial markets.3 However,
the banks in Chile represented less than 1% of the operations of the holdings in Spain.
Therefore, it can be fairly assumed that the merger was driven by contingencies in the
Spanish financial markets and not by contingencies in the Chilean markets.
The merged bank had a dominant position in the Chilean bank industry with 27%
of the market share, its closest competitor was Banco de Chile with 22% market share.
Given the magnitude of the merger, it raises concerns regarding potential changes in the
lending policies of the merged banks. We address these concerns in the robustness checks
section. A second concern is that the banks could have merged for endogenous reasons.
We already make the point that the merger was triggered by the merger of two holdings
in Spain, other than that the two banks had no commercial ties before the merger of the
Spanish Holdings. This makes it unlikely that the two banks may have merged in the
absence of the BSCH merger.
In our analysis, the treatment group consists of firms that before the merger were
borrowing from both of the merged banks. The control group consists of firms that had
loans from banks that did not merge. 4 After the merger, the companies in the treatment
group end up having only one bank lending relationship. However firms in the control
group still have two bank lending relationships after the merger.
In Figure 1 we show a diagram of the loans for firms in the treatment and firms in the
control groups. We see in the picture that both firms in the treatment group and firms in
the control group have two bank lending relationships before the merger. However, after
the merger firms in the treatment group have only one bank lending relationship.
To further sharpen the identification in our analysis, we construct both the control
group and the treatment group with firms that prior to the merger had a bank lending
relationship with the acquirer, this way we aim to make both groups more similar. Firms
in the treatment group have a second bank lending relationship with the bank that was
acquired while firms in the control group have a second bank lending relationship with
a bank that was untouched by the merger. Furthermore we drop from the control firms
3See Jose Tomas Morel (2003) for details
4For simplicity, in the methodology section we describe the setup for the analysis of a reduction from
two lender to one lender. However we also estimate the more general case of a reduction from N lenders
to N-1 lenders
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Figure 1: Treatment and Control Groups
that had as a second lender a publicly owned bank, or a bank that was less than 50% the
size of the target. Government owned banks usually have political considerations in their
lending policy (for details see La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer 2002 and Sapienza
2004). Small banks are more willing to engage in relational lending than big banks and
therefore also engage in different lending practices (see Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and
Stein 2005). We call ”potential targets” all banks that were used to construct the control
groups. The assumption in our analysis is that the firms in our sample could have chosen
the ”potential targets” instead of the realized target as their second lending banks.
In table 16 we see that the target and potential target banks are similar in the year
that preceded the merger. 5 The target and the potential target banks have similar default
rates (9.92% the target vs. 9.48% the ”potential target”) and they have similar quantities
of firms with 1, 2 and 3 bank lending relations. The target has 30.22% clients with 1
lending while the ”potential target” has 33.47%. The comparison for clients with two
bank lending relationships is 35.36% in the target and 36.6% in the potential target and
the comparison for clients having three bank lending relationships is 21.14% in the target
and 19.42% in the ”potential target”. One important difference between the two groups is
5This table presents the characteristics of the target and potential target for all their clients, not
only the ones included in our analysis. our analysis only considers those clients that have bank lending
relationships with both the acquirer, target and potential target which is about 5% of the total clients.
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the average loan size, which is 30% higher for the target. This difference is explained by the
fact that the target had a smaller division for micro credit lending. In order to overcome
this potential problem, we estimate the change in the relevant variables matching by loan
size. All the results in the paper are presented by loan size. An aggregated estimation,
using equal weights for each loan quintile, is also presented in each table.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
The data for this study are obtained from the Chilean Office for Bank Regulation (SBIF),
which contains information on every firm that has debt in the formal Chilean financial
system.
For each relationship between bank i and a firm j the database contains yearly infor-
mation on total loan size, amount past due for 60 days or less, amount past due for less
than 90 days, and amount past due for more than 89 days6. In addition to the variables
contained in the database, we constructed the following variables: number of bank lending
relations of each firm defined as the number of banks the firm borrows from, aggregated
loan size defined as the total debt the firm has in the financial system, and a dummy vari-
able for default which is defined as 1 if the firm has any amount past due in the financial
system for more than 90 days and 0 otherwise.
The treatment group consists of all the firms that have bank lending relationships with
both the acquirer and the target. The control group consists of firms that have a bank
lending relationship with the acquirer and a bank that is not the target.
In table 1, we present the basic summary statistics for the treatment and the control
groups before the merger. The average loan size for firms in the treatment group is US$
55,000 while the average loan size for firms in the control group is US$ 30,000. To control
for this difference, we divide both the firms in the treatment group and the firms in the
control group into quintiles according to their loan size. By construction, the average loan
size among the loan quintiles is almost identical. We make all our estimations by quintile
and then evaluate the average using a simple matching estimation with equal weights for
each quintile. The average loan size for firms in the first quintile is approximately US$
1,300 and for firms in the second quintile is US$ 3,400. For the remainder of the quintiles,
the average loan size is US$ 6200, US$ 12000 and US$ 230,000, respectively.
The aggregated default rate before the merger is 7.37% for the treatment group and
6The value corresponds to the variable at December the 31st of each year
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8.85% for the control group. In both groups the default rate does not change monotonically
with the loan size. In the treatment group, firms in the lowest loan quintile have the lowest
default rate and firms in the highest loan quintile have the second lowest default rate. In
the control group, firms with the lowest and highest loan size also have the smallest default
rates, but firms in the highest loan quintile are the ones with the lowest default rates.
In table 2 we present summary statistics for the sample after the merger. The default
rate increases in both the treatment and control groups, but the increase is much sharper
for the treatment group ( from 7.37% to 10.69%) than for the control group ( from 8.85% to
10.82%). When we observe the default rates by quintile, the sharp increase in the default
rates of the firms in the treatment group comes mainly from loan quintiles 3, 4 and 5.
From loan quintile 4, the increase is especially dramatic (changes from 8.32 to 12.98).
5 Results and Discussion
The main analysis of this paper are presented in tables 3 through 9. In tables 3 and 4
we explore how an exogenous reduction in the number of lenders affects the probability of
adding a new bank lending relationship. In tables 5 to 8 we study whether the reduction
in the number of lending banks affects the firm’s access to credit. Finally in table 9 we
study how a reduction in the number of bank lending relationships affects the probability
of default.
In tables 3 and 4, we observe that firms have specific targets for the number of banks
they wish to borrow from. In particular, in table 3 we see that firms whose number of
bank relationships were reduced from two to one as a consequence of the merger have
a 23.23% higher probability of adding a new bank lending relationship within five years
after the merger, compared to similar firms which were not affected by the merger. This
effect is less strong for firms whose number of banks relationships were reduced from three
to two (18.83% effect) and for firms whose number of banks were reduced from four to
three (14.06% effect). The diminishing likelihood of adding a second bank as the number
of banking relationships increase is not surprising. One would expect that the effect of a
reduction in the number of lenders would be strongest for the firms that do not have other
outside financing option.
In table 4, we explore to what extent loan size affects the probability of a firm adding a
new bank lending relationship after the reduction in the number of lenders. We find that the
effect of the merger on the probability of adding a new bank lending relationship within five
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years after the merger is similar across all loan quintiles (ranging from 16.41% to 17.17%).
However, on average, firms in the fifth loan quintile add new bank lending relationships
faster than the rest of the firms. More specifically, firms in the fifth loan quintile have
a 14.61% higher probability of adding a new bank lending relationship within two years
after the merger, compared to similar firms which were not affected by the merger. This
represents 85% of the overall effect observed within five years. For the remaining firms, the
probability of adding a new bank lending relationship within two years after the merger is
9.34% higher compared to similar firms that were unaffected by the merger. This represent
56% of the effect observed within five years for the firms in the fifth loan quintile. There
are two potential explanations for this finding. First, it may be more costly for firms in the
fifth loan quintile to finance with fewer lenders. If they experience a higher reduction in
the access to credit or a higher increase in the interest rates. Second, it may be easier for
firms in the fifth loan quintile to add new bank lending relationships. For instance, they
may have lower asymmetric information problems. Using our data set, we can rule out
the possibility that firms in the fifth quintile return more quickly to their original number
of lenders because of a larger reduction in access to credit. In fact, in table 5, we show
that firms in in the fifth loan quintile experience a lower reduction in credit availability
than firms in the second, third and fourth loan quintile. It is likely that firms in the fifth
quintile are able to return to their original number of lenders because they depend less on
relational lending and more on arm’s length lending. In fact, large firms usually have more
verifiable cash flows and can therefore engage in arm’s length lending relationships which
can be initiated faster than relational lending relationships.
In tables 5 through 8, we explore how a reduction in lenders, brought about by the
merger, impacts total loan size for firms. In table 5, we present the change in loan size
for the firms whose number of bank lending relationships were reduced from two to one.
Overall, there is a 14.5% decrease in the total loan amount. There are several potential
explanations for this finding. The first, and, the most natural explanation, is that there
was a bank wide policy change after the merger. In the robustness checks section, we rule
out this explanation by studying the effect that the merger had on firms which had a single
bank lending relationship with one of the merging banks. For these banks, their quantity
of banking partners remained constant following the merger, but they would have been
exposed to the same policy changes as the firms who had a decrease in their number of
banking partners. In the robustness checks section we provide evidence that show that this
13
effect was not driven by a change in the policy of the merged bank.7 A second possible
explanation is that the bank wanted to diversify its portfolio because it felt that after
the merger it was over exposed to certain clients. However, after the merger the average
loan size is negligible compared to the assets of the bank. Nonetheless, the diversification
motivation is still possible if there are agency costs between the bank and its loan officers.
A potential agency problem between the bank and its loan officers can be understood as
follows: Loan officers have strong power in the loan evaluation process. Sometimes they
directly decide on the loan size, but even if they do not directly decide the size of the loan,
they can affect the decision of the bank by manipulating the information they present
about the client. Loan officers are usually paid according to the growth and default rate of
their portfolio. However they manage a small fraction of the banks’ portfolio. Therefore
they can have strong incentives to diversify their portfolio more than what is efficient for
the bank. This could eventually be solved by implementing more sophisticated contracts
between the bank and its loan officers, however anecdotal evidence suggest that banks do
not implement complex contract with its loan officers. Furthermore in order to compensate
officers for the medium or long term profitability of their portfolio, the bank should reduce
the rotation of loan officers. However reducing the rotation of loan officers can increase
the relevance of other friction like moral hazard in communication (see Hertzberg, Liberty
and Paravisini 2008).
A third explanation for why the average loan size is smaller for firms whose number of
banking partners were impacted by the merger is given by Bolton and Scharfstein (1996).
In their model, an increase in the number of lenders complicates renegotiation and may
deter firms from entering strategic default. Given their logic, in our quasi experiment
where we see a reduction in the number of lenders, we should find the opposite effect. The
reduction in the number of lenders can facilitate the renegotiation of loans in the event
of default, because firms now only have to negotiate with one party. This may change
the risk incentives of firms. If firms anticipate that the cost of defaulting will be lower
they may ex ante be willing to engage in more risky projects thus increasing the default
rate. Second, even if firms’ project generate enough cash flows to pay back the loan, firms
can decide to strategically default in order to renegotiate better terms for the repayment
of the loan. The observed reduction in loan size may be a reaction of the bank to the
expected increase in default rate generated by these effects. To understand to what extent
renegotiation complications could explain the reduction in credit size we studied whether
7A complete description of the robustness checks estimation is presented in a separated section
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the probability of leaving default was affected by a reduction in the number of lenders.
In table 5 in the appendix we observe that in average the probability of leaving default
does not experience a significant increase as a consequence of a reduction in the number of
lenders. However in table 6 in the appendix, where we divide the sample according to the
distribution of the credit amongst the lending banks, we observe that firms with a similar
amount of credit in each on the lending banks 8 experience an increase in the probability
of leaving default, on the contrary firms that have most of their debt in one of the lending
banks experience a reduction in the probability of leaving default. This suggests that the
reduction in total loan amount for firms with most of their debt concentrated in one of the
lending banks is not explained by the mechanism described in Bolton and Scharfstein.
A fourth explanation is given by Thakor (1996). In his model firms will borrow from
multiple lenders to reduce the risk of being denied credit. The mechanism works as follows;
If banks observe the quality of the clients with noise, creditworthy firms are at risk of being
labeled as poor performing clients and experience an inefficient reduction in their access to
credit. By having multiple lenders firms reduce the risk of being denied credit because of
noisy screening.9 In our quasi experiment, firms that were originally borrowing from both
merging banks have a reduction in the number of lenders and therefore may experience an
increase in the probability of being labeled as bad clients that may explain the reduction
in their credit availability.
We also observe in table 5 that firms in the lowest loan quintile (micro credit below
US$ 3,000 in total loan amount) do not experience a reduction in access to credit. This
suggests that firms in the micro credit segment benefit by concentrating their loans with
only one bank, as predicted in the model of Rajan (1992) and as shown in Petersen and
Rajan (1994). Nonetheless all the other mechanisms, presented previously, that go in the
direction of reducing the credit availability still hold, and may offset the benefits from a
more informed lending relationship (see Bolton and Scharftein (1996) and Thakor (1996)).
It is puzzling however that the effect described in Rajan (1992) is only present for firms
with loans below US$ 3,000, as is seems reasonable to assume that firms with loans below
US$10,000 would still benefit from informed bank relations. This puzzle may be explained
by the model in Petersen and Rajan (1995). In their model, they describe how intense
competition in the credit markets makes it difficult for banks to extract rents from firms in
the future. This in turn will make it less attractive for banks to engage in relational lending.
8The firms in this sub group have at least 30% of their credit in each of the lending banks.
9The only assumption that has to be made is that the noise in the screening process is not perfectly
correlated among banks.
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The Petersen and Rajan model could explain this puzzle if competition in the Chilean credit
markets is less intense for firms with small loan sizes. In unreported estimations, we find
evidence supporting this explanation: firms with loans between US$ 3,000 and US$ 10,000
have a 7.2% greater probability of transiting from a single to a multiple lender relationship
than firms with loans below US$ 3,000. We can also note in table 5 that the reduction
in the loan size is decreasing in the size of the loan for firms in the second, third, fourth
and fifth quintiles. Even though this relationship is not statistically significant, it suggests
that larger firms experience a smaller reduction in credit.
To better understand why larger firms experience a lower reduction in credit availability,
we look to see the impact of merger on the total loan amount that firms receive from their
original lenders, this analysis differs from the estimation in table 5 in that it excludes
the loans these firms received from bank relationships started after the merger (see table
6). The reduction in loan size from the original lenders observed for firms in the first
loan quintile is significantly lower than the reduction in loan size for firms in the higher
loan quintiles. This finding supports the explanation that micro credit firms benefit from
concentrating their loans with only one borrower. Contrary to what we observe in table 5,
in table 6 we see that firms in the second, third, fourth and fifth loan quintiles experience
a similar decrease in the lending from their original lenders. This suggest that the smaller
reduction in credit availability observed in table 5 for firms in higher loan quintiles may be
explained by a higher capacity of bigger firms to offset the reduction in credit by lending
from alternative sources, and not by a smaller reduction in the loan size they got from the
merging bank.
In table number 7, we present the reduction in total loan amount for firms that were
borrowing from three or more lenders before the merger. The difference between the
estimations in this table and the estimations in table 5 is that the firms studied in table
7 had three or more bank lending relationships before the merger, and therefore after the
merger had at least one alternative source of funding in addition to the merged bank. The
results in this table are similar to those in table 5. One interesting difference is that firms
in the highest loan quintile that had three or more bank lending relationships before the
merger do not experience a significant reduction in their total loan amount. There are at
least two explanations for this finding; The first one is that firms in the highest loan quintile,
with three or more lenders before the merger, did not experience a reduction in lending
from the merged bank. The second explanation is that these firms experienced a reduction
in credit from the merged bank but were able to offset this reduction in credit by borrowing
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from alternative sources. In table 13, were we present the reduction in credit size these
firms received from the merged bank, we see that firms in the highest loan quintile that
had three or more bank lending relationships before the merger, experienced a reduction
of 28% in the lending from the merged bank, furthermore this reduction is not statistically
different from the reduction experienced by firms in the second, third and fourth quintiles.
This provides evidence that large firms, having multiple lending relationships before the
merger, were similarly affected by the reduction in credit from the merged bank as firms in
other loan quintiles, however only firms in the highest loan quintile were able to offset the
reduction in credit by lending from alternative sources. It is interesting to note that small
and medium sized firms were not able to offset the reduction in credit availability even
if they had multiple lending relationships before the merger. This suggests that adverse
selection affected the capacity of small and medium sized firms to get credit even from pre
existing bank relationships.
In table 8, we present the reduction in the availability of credit by the length of the
bank lending relationship with the acquirer.10 we find that firms having long relationships
with the acquirer experience a larger reduction in the availability of credit as a result of
a decrease in the number of bank lending relationships than firms having a relatively new
bank lending relationship with the acquirer. This effect holds for firms in all loan quintiles,
however it is only statistically significant for firms in the first loan quintile. This difference
is also significant in the aggregated, but only at the 10% level. One explanation for this
finding is that the merged bank implemented a larger reduction in the access to credit for
clients having a long term relationships with the acquirer.
In table 9, we present the change in default rate for firms whose number of bank lending
relationships were reduced from 2 to 1 as a consequence of the merger. Overall the default
rate for these firms is 1.26% larger compared to similar firms unaffected by the merger.
This finding supports the prediction in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), according to this
model a reduction in the number of lender will make it easier for the firms to renegotiate
the terms of its debt. The positive effect on renegotiation can have to negative effects
on the incentives of the firm’s management. First, knowing the cost of renegotiation will
be lower they may decide to engage in more risky projects, second even if they engage
in efficient projects they may decide to strategically default on the loan to improve the
terms of the loan contract. The findings in table 9 support only the later mechanism.
10Given data limitations, we divide the sample into two groups: (1) firms having a bank lending relation-
ship with the acquirer greater than or equal to two years and (2) firms having a bank lending relationship
with the acquirer for less than two years
17
If firms were risk shifting in their investment decision we should observe higher default
rates that are persistent in time. However we find that the increase in default rate is
transient and disappears four year after the merger. The effect on default rates being
transient could be better understood if it is driven by strategic default. Firm could decide
to strategically default on the loan just after the merger to improve the terms of the loan
contract, however after the terms are renegotiated the firms should not show higher default
rates compared with similar firms unaffected by the merger. We also observe in table 9 that
firms in loan quintiles 1 and 2 do not show an increase in default rate, furthermore firms
in the second loan quintile show a decrease in the default rate. There are two potential
explanation for this finding. First these firms may be benefited from a more concentrated
lending. According to Rajan (1992) model and in lines with the result in Petersen and
Rajan (1994) small firms have lower default rates when they engage in relational lending
usually associated to single lending. A second explanation also supported by Rajan (1992)
is that small firms engaging in relational lending will be closely monitored by the bank
and therefore it will be difficult for them to engage in strategic default.
6 Robustness Checks
6.1 Potential Change in Lending Policy
A principal concern with the methodology we used in our results section is that the observed
results could be driven by changes in the lending policy of the merged banks. To address
this concern, we study whether the findings in the quasi-experiment analysis are also
observed in firms that had a single bank lending relationship with one of the banks that
merged. For these firms, their number of lending banks was unaffected by the merger, but
they would have been exposed to the merged bank policy changes.
Figure 2 displays information regarding the control and treatment groups for the ro-
bustness check estimation. We can see that all the firms included in this estimation have
one bank lending relationship before and after the treatment and thus none of these firms
experienced a change in their number of banking relationships. However, firms in the
treatment group are affected by potential changes in the policy of the merged bank, while
firms in the control group are not affected by a change in the policy of the merged bank,
because the do not have a lending relationship with the bank.
I perform a difference-in-difference analysis for the group of firms having a single lending
relationship with the merged banks, relative to a comparison group of firms that had a
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Figure 2: Robustness Check: Treatment and Control Groups
single bank lending relationship with a bank that did not merge. If our findings in the
quasi-experiment were driven by changes in the lending policy of the merged bank, the
findings should still hold in the estimation for firms with single bank relationships. In
tables 10, 11 and 12, we present the results of this robustness check estimation. In table
10, we present the analysis for the probability of adding a new bank lending relationship.
In table 1.11, we display our analysis for the total loan amount. Lastly, in table 1.12, we
present our analysis for the change in default rates.
In table 10, we present the difference in the probability of adding a new bank lending
relationship after the merger between firms that borrowed from only one the merging banks
compared to firms that borrowed from a single bank that did not merge. We observe that
in average firms that were borrowing from only one of the merging banks have a lower
probability of adding a new bank lending relationship than firms which were borrowing
from a single bank that did not merge. This is not too surprising since firms borrowing
from one of the banks that merged probably got access to some new services after the
merger (provided by the merged banks from which the firms was not borrowing).
In table 11, we present the estimation for the change in the outstanding loan before and
after the merger. We observe that the change in total loan amount for clients holding loans
with either the acquirer or the target (third column) is five times smaller than the effect
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for clients holding loans with both the target and the acquirer (fourth column), 2.95%
compared to 14.35. However, there is important variation across quintiles. Firms in the
first loan size quintile increase their total outstanding loans in 4.44%. On the contrary,
firms with loans in the third loan size quintile have a reduction in their total outstanding
loans of 8.43%. This high fluctuations casts some concerns regarding the interpretation of
the results for this variable in the quasi-experiment. However, even the maximum observed
reduction in the total loan amount for firms with single bank relationships (8.43% for firms
in the third quintile) is still less than 50% the effect in the quasi-experiment. It is also
interesting to note that clients borrowing only from the aquirer experience a significant
increase in their total loan amount while clients borrowing only from the target experience
a significant decrease in their total loan amount. This result suggest that some information
is lost for clients with loans in the target (as some of the loan officers in the target were fired
after the merger), however this hypothesis cannot be fully identified given data limitation.
Another interesting result is that the biggest reduction in total loan amount is experienced
by clients having bank relationships with both the acquirer and the target bank who
hold most of their debt with the acquirer, because this clients should be well known by
the acquirer loan officers (who were not fired) we cannot explain this reduction by an
information problem, therefore this finding suggest that it is the reduction in the total
loan amount is explained by the reduction in the number of lending banks.
6.2 Potential Differences Between Treatment and Control Group
Another concern is that the findings in this study could be explained by differences between
the treatment group and the control group. By using an exogenous shock to the number
of banks we are already addressing this issue.
To further address this concern in tables 14 to 15 we estimate the effect of the merger
on the probability of adding a new bank lending relationship and in the total loan amount
for the fraction of the sample for which we have information on sales and assets.
In table 14 we estimate the effect of the merger on the probability of adding a new
bank lending relationship controlling for companies’ assets and sales. We observe that
the findings in this estimation are consistent with the findings in tables 3 and 4, where
we run a difference in difference estimation, for the entire sample but without controls .
In particular in table 14 we observe that the probability of adding a new bank lending
relationship as a consequence of the merger is 5% after 1 year, 11% after 2 years and
10.9% after 3 years, whereas in table 4 the estimation for this variable was 5.47% after 1
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year 10.39% after 2 years and 14.67% after 3 years. Even thought the estimations are not
exactly the same they are similar in direction and order of magnitude.
In table 15 we estimate the effect of the merger on the total loan size controlling for
companies’ assets and sales. We observe that the findings in this estimation are consistent
with the findings in table 5. In particular in table 15 we observe that the merger generates
a decrease in the loan size of 21.9% after controlling for sales and assets, whereas in table 5
the reduction ranges from 21.52% to 13.38% depending on the loan quintile.11 Summarizing
both estimations go in the same direction and are not statistically different.
In short, both robustness checks provides grounds for confidence that the results of the
quasi-experiment are due to an exogenous change in the number of bank relationships and
not the result of changed post-merger lending policy.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines how the number of lenders used by firms affects their access to funds,
by means of a quasi-experiment generated by the merger of two major banks in Chile in
2002. This merger exogenously reduced the number of bank lenders for some firms in Chile
and this exogenous shock is used to address the potential endogeneity, self selection and
unobservable variables biases in previous empirical work.
In a frictionless financial market such as the one described in Modigliani and Miller
(1958), firms are indifferent with respect to the number of bank lending relationships
they have. However, in a market with asymmetric information, commitment problems or
transaction costs the number of bank relationships it has can affect the firm’s ability to
raise funds and its incentives to exert effort and repay the loan (see for example: Rajan
(1992), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and Thakor (1996))
This paper provides evidence that, contrary to what would happen in a frictionless
market, companies appear to have a target for the number of banks from which they bor-
row: firms whose number of banking partners was reduced by the merger were about 19%
more likely to add a new bank lending relationship compared to similar firms unaffected
by the merger.12
To distinguish between different theories that explain this finding, we examine the effect
11This range is for quintiles 2, 3, 4 and 5. Quintile 1 is not considered because most firms in this quintile
do not have assets and sales information and therefore are not included in the estimation in table 15
12Defined as the probability of increasing the number of banking partners in the five years following the
merger
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of the number of bank lending relationships on the firm’s total debt outstanding.
I find that firms which went from having two to one bank lending relationships as a
result of the merger experienced on average a 15% reduction in the total loan size, compared
to similar firms unaffected by the merger.
These findings are consistent with the model in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) in that
the outstanding loan decreases and the default rate increases after a reduction in the
number of bank lenders. However, the predictions in Rajan (1992) are not observed in the
aggregate results, although for firms with loans in the lowest loan quintile, we do observe
evidence supporting Rajan’s predictions. A potential explanation is that the asymmetric
information problem that explains the benefit of informed lending in Rajan is more relevant
for smaller firms, where hard information about the firm is less likely to be available for
the bank.
The observed reduction in the total outstanding loan amount is also consistent with
the model in Thakor (1996) in that the outstanding loan amount falls after a reduction
in the number of lenders. An alternative explanation for the reduction in loan size, not
explored in the literature, is that agency problems between the bank and the loan officers
generate incentives for the loan officers to over-diversify compared with what is optimal
for the bank. This may happen if each loan officer’s wage is linked to the default rate
of his own portfolio, which is a small fraction of the bank’s portfolio. Further theoretical
research is needed to explore this alternative explanation.
Important questions remain unanswered and provide avenues for future research. For
example, due to data limitations this study does not explore the effect of the number of
lenders on the price of the loan, which would help understand the motivations of firms in
choosing the number of bank lending relationships. It would also be of interest to consider
whether a reduction in the number of bank lending relationships has any effect on the
sales, profits, costs and productivity of firms. However, this would require more detailed
information on firms than is currently available.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics Before the Merger
In this table we present summary statistics for the treatment and control groups. All the firms in both
groups have two bank lending relationships. The firms in the treatment group have lending relationships
with the acquirer and with the acquired banks while the firms in the control have lending relationships
with the acquirer and with a bank that did not merge. The debt presented in this table is the sum of the
loans in each of the lending banks and we present the standard deviations in parentheses. The default rate
was calculated as the fraction of firms having past due payments of 90 days or more at the end of 2001, but
we excluded from the calculation the firms that were already in default at the end of 1999. The probability
of leaving financial distress was calculated as the fraction of firms without past due payments of 90 days
or more at the end of 2001. Only firms in default, at the end of 1999, were used in this estimation.
variable Treatment Control
General Variables
number of firms 5648 9897
loan mean 55423 29665
(1013205) (261675)
loan p25 2889 1849
loan median 6212 3815
loan p75 13946 8187
default rate 7.37 8.85
prob. Leave def. 35.32 34.62
Variables by quintile
Number of firms
quintile 1 1128 3272
quintile 2 1130 2373
quintile 3 1130 1754
quintile 4 1130 1311
quintile 5 1130 1187
Loan mean
quintile 1 1265 1333
(646) (609)
quintile 2 3460 3396
(655) (656)
quintile 3 6293 6173
(1001) (1004)
quintile 4 11956 11681
(2947) (2778)
quintile 5 254047 214851
(2255061) (729551)
Default rate
quintile 1 6.21 8.01
quintile 2 8.23 9.69
quintile 3 7.43 9.92
quintile 4 8.32 9.92
quintile 5 6.64 6.74
Probability of leaving financial distress
quintile 1 39.13 33.18
quintile 2 48.94 38.85
quintile 3 27.66 35.42
quintile 4 23.4 28.33
quintile 5 37.5 35.09
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Table 2: Summary Statistics After the Merger
In this table we present summary statistics for the treatment and control groups. All the firms in both
groups have two bank lending relationships. The firms in the treatment group have lending relationships
with the acquirer and with the acquired banks while the firms in the control have lending relationships
with the acquirer and with a bank that did not merge. The debt presented in this table is the sum of the
loans in each of the lending banks and we present the standard deviations in parentheses. The default rate
was calculated as the fraction of firms having past due payments of 90 days or more at the end of 2003, but
we excluded from the calculation the firms that were already in default at the end of 2001. The probability
of leaving financial distress was calculated as the fraction of firms without past due payments of 90 days
or more at the end of 2003. Only firms in default, at the end of 2001, were used in this estimation.
variable Treatment Control
General Variables
number of firms 5780 12131
loan mean 45672 23182
(597505) (285356)
loan p25 2804 1609
loan median 6470 3348
loan p75 15900 7105
default rate 10.69 10.82
prob. Leave def. 34.69 37.18
Variables by quintile
Number of firms
quintile 1 1155 4291
quintile 2 1156 3278
quintile 3 1156 2149
quintile 4 1156 1249
quintile 5 1157 1164
Loan mean
quintile 1 1107 1198
(639) (589)
quintile 2 3433 3327
(731) (719)
quintile 3 6562 6421
(1159) (1159)
quintile 4 13374 13022
(3295) (3239)
quintile 5 203708 201982
(1324161) (902082)
Default rate
quintile 1 6.84 8.58
quintile 2 10.21 13.24
quintile 3 11.68 12.19
quintile 4 12.98 11.05
quintile 5 11.75 9.54
Probability of leaving financial distress
quintile 1 35.42 39.23
quintile 2 30.61 40.09
quintile 3 40.82 35.87
quintile 4 26.53 28.36
quintile 5 40 30.43
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Table 3: Increase in probability of adding a bank lending relationship after an exogenous
reduction in the number of bank lenders
In this table, we study whether an exogenous reduction to the number of lending relationships increases
the likelihood that the firm adds a new bank lending relationship. The estimation is evaluated as the
probability that a firm whose number of lending relationships was reduced by the merger adds a new bank
lending relationship compared to the probability that a similar firm that was unaffected by the merger
adds a new bank lending relationship. The results are presented by the number of banks that the firms
had pre-merger. Each row presents the probability that a firm that had N banks before the merger (and
therefore N-1 after the merger) adds a new bank lending relationship after the merger, compared to similar
firms that were unaffected by the merger. The last row presents the average estimated using equal weights
for firms having two, three and four banks pre-merger. The different columns present the probability of
adding a new bank lending relationships for different time frames (one, two, three, four and five years after
the merger).
quintile P(1st year) P(2nd year) P(3rd year) P(4th year) P(5th year)
Two banks 6.38*** 14.53*** 19.28*** 21.81*** 23.23***
(0.69) (0.8) (0.82) (0.83) (0.84)
Three banks 6.87*** 12.3*** 17.07*** 18.33*** 18.83***
(0.59) (0.65) (0.68) (0.67) (0.68)
Four banks 6.85*** 9.86*** 13.21*** 14.25*** 14.06***
(0.71) (0.77) (0.78) (0.75) (0.77)
average 6.7*** 12.23*** 16.52*** 18.13*** 18.71***
(0.38) (0.43) (0.44) (0.43) (0.44)
Estimation example
Number of banks group of firms P(new bank) 2 years P(new bank) 5 years
Two banks affected by merger 34.08 44.86
Two banks unaffected by merger 19.55 21.63
Difference 14.53 23.23
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Table 4: Increase in probability of adding a bank lending relationship after an exogenous
reduction in the number of bank lenders
In this table, we study whether an exogenous reduction to the number of lending relationships increases
the likelihood that the firm adds a new bank lending relationship. The estimation is evaluated as the
probability that a firm whose number of lending relationships was reduced by the merger adds a new bank
lending relationship compared to the probability that a similar firm that was unaffected by the merger adds
a new bank lending relationship. The results are presented for each category of debt (divided by quintiles
accouding to the total loan amount). The aggregated effect is presented in the last row “aggregated” and
is evaluated using a simple matching estimation with equal weights for each loan quintile.
quintile P(1st year) P(2nd year) P(3rd year) P(4th year) P(5th year)
quintile 1 5.33*** 8.59*** 13.67*** 15.5*** 16.41***
(0.77) (0.87) (0.93) (0.93) (0.95)
quintile 2 4.37*** 11.34*** 16.11*** 16.67*** 16.58***
(0.8) (0.93) (0.97) (0.96) (0.98)
quintile 3 4.4*** 8.53*** 14.03*** 16.45*** 16.51***
(0.86) (0.96) (1.01) (1) (1.02)
quintile 4 4.98*** 8.9*** 11.03*** 14.58*** 17.17***
(0.96) (1.08) (1.11) (1.09) (1.12)
quintile 5 8.25*** 14.61*** 18.51*** 17.4*** 17.09***
(1.06) (1.2) (1.21) (1.21) (1.22)
aggregated 5.47*** 10.39*** 14.67*** 16.12*** 16.75***
(0.4) (0.45) (0.47) (0.47) (0.48)
29
Table 5: Reduction in total debt outstanding for firms reducing their number of bank
lending relations from two to one
In this table, we present the reduction in the total value of the outstanding loans generated by a reduction
in the number of lending relations. Each reported coefficient is the outcome of a difference in difference
estimation. The first difference is the average loan size increase over a period of two years (since the
merger) for firms that reduced their lending relations from two to one, as a consequence of the merger,
minus the average loan size increase of similar firms that were not affected by the merger. To control for
any pre-existing differences, we subtract the difference in loan increase (over a period of two years) that
the two groups had right before the merger. The difference in the total debt outstanding is presented two,
three and four years after the merger to test whether the effect is persistent over time. The results are
presented for each category of debt (divided in quintiles according to loan size). The aggregated effect is
presented in row ALL and is evaluated using a simple matching estimation with equal weights for each
loan quintile. In table 1.5.b, we present an example of the calculations used to estimate table 1.5.
quintile effect after two years effect after three years effect after four years
quintile 1 -1.16 3.09 0.62
(5.38) (5.41) (5.43)
quintile 2 -21.52*** -20.38*** -24.15***
(4.99) (5.25) (5.43)
quintile 3 -19.11*** -20.16*** -21.4***
(4.63) (5.07) (5.37)
quintile 4 -16.6*** -23.8*** -23.47***
(4.78) (5.23) (5.64)
quintile 5 -13.38*** -14.57*** -11.56**
(4.29) (4.78) (5.23)
ALL -14.35*** -15.16*** -15.99***
(2.29) (2.44) (2.54)
N treatment 4817 4526 4286
N control 10126 9464 8897
Estimation example
quintile change before merger change after merger difference in difference
ALL 39.05 34.6
ALL 37.72 51.25
First Difference 1.33 -16.65 -14.35
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Table 6: Reduction in outstanding loans from the original lenders
In this table, we redo the estimation in table 1.5 excluding the loans that firms got from new bank lending
relationships.
quintile effect after two years effect after three years effect after four years
quintile 1 -7.16 -7.76 -17.57***
(5.64) (5.96) (6.15)
quintile 2 -23.89*** -27.54*** -36.06***
(4.78) (5.18) (5.54)
quintile 3 -26.51*** -30.77*** -35.34***
(4.25) (4.7) (5.05)
quintile 4 -23.13*** -32.39*** -36.01***
(4.47) (4.87) (5.26)
quintile 5 -22.59*** -25.31*** -27.86***
(3.85) (4.24) (4.66)
ALL -20.65*** -24.75*** -30.57***
(2.19) (2.36) (2.5)
N treatment 4817 4526 4286
N control 10126 9464 8897
Table 7: Reduction in outstanding loans for firms with 3 or more bank lending relationships
pre merger
In this table, we repeat the estimations in table 1.5 considering firms that had 3 or more bank lending
relationships before the merger. The purpose of this table is to evaluate to which extent having an
alternative source of funding other than the merging bank helps to offset the reduction in lending from
the merging banks.
quintile effect after two years effect after three years effect after four years
1 -5.79 -4.26 -5.45
(5.47) (5.71) (5.87)
2 -18.94*** -18.13*** -24.54***
(4.59) (5.14) (5.48)
3 -11.4*** -10.01** -14.59***
(4.24) (4.81) (5.26)
4 -15.1*** -17.05*** -23.88***
(4.5) (5.06) (5.59)
5 -0.39 -3.05 -2.06
(4.32) (4.93) (5.45)
ALL -10.32*** -10.5*** -14.1***
(2.14) (2.37) (2.53)
N target 3699 3389 3208
N mock target 8050 7387 6918
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Table 8: Reduction in total debt outstanding for firms reducing their number of bank
lending relations from two to one by length of relationship with the acquirer.
In this table, we present the effect of a reduction in the number of lenders on the firm’s total loan amount.
We divide the sample into firms that had a bank lending relationship of more than 2 years with the
acquirer and firms that had a relationship of less than two years with the acquirer. Each row presents
the estimation for a different loan category (divided by quintiles according to the loan size). In the last
row we present the agregated effect evaluated using a matching estimation with equal weights for each
loan quintile. In column one we presents the effect of a reduction in the number of lenders on the total
loan amount of firms that had a lending relationship of less than two years with the acquirer. In column
2 we present the effect of a reduction in the number of lenders on the total loan amount of firms that
had a lending relationship of more than two years with the acquirer. Finally in column three we present
the difference between the effect for firms with long relationships with the acquirer and firms with short
relationships with the acquirer .
quintile less than two year relationship more than two year relationship ∆
quintile 1 8.17 -7.9 16.07*
(6.92) (6.24) (9.32)
quintile 2 -16.69** -23.87*** 7.18
(7.07) (5.52) (8.97)
quintile 3 -17.33*** -20.04*** 2.71
(6.46) (5.12) (8.25)
quintile 4 -14.93** -17.05*** 2.12
(7.29) (5.21) (8.96)
quintile 5 -8.48 -14.89*** 6.42
(7.34) (4.49) (8.61)
ALL -9.85*** -16.75*** 6.9*
(3.14) (2.39) (3.95)
N target 1509 3308
N mock target 3467 6659
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Table 9: Increase in default rate for firms reducing their number of bank lending relations
from two to one
In this table we estimate the change in default rate spurred by a reduction in the number of lending
relations. Each reported coefficient is the outcome of a difference in difference estimation. The first
difference averages the default rate of firms that reduced their lending relations from two to one, as a
consequence of the merger, minus the average default rate of similar firms that were not affected by the
merger. To control for any pre-existing differences, we subtract the difference in the variables that the
two groups had immediately preceding the merger. The estimation is presented for two, three and four
years after the merger to test whether the effect is persistent over time. The results are presented for each
category of debt (divided in quintiles according to loan size). The aggregated effect is presented in row
ALL and is evaluated using a simple matching estimation with equal weights for each loan quintile. In
table 1.9.b, we present an example of the calculations used to estimate table 1.9.
quintile effect after two years effect after three years effect after four years
quintile 1 0.07 0.43 -0.56
(1.22) (1.28) (1.28)
quintile 2 -1.57 -2.21 -2.73*
(1.48) (1.51) (1.56)
quintile 3 1.97 0.63 1.42
(1.58) (1.65) (1.7)
quintile 4 3.52** 1.75 0.72
(1.77) (1.86) (1.91)
quintile 5 2.32 2.16 2.08
(1.65) (1.75) (1.74)
All 1.26* 0.55 0.19
(0.69) (0.73) (0.74)
N treatment 5780 5780 5780
N control 12131 12131 12131
Estimation Example
group quintile default before merger default after merger dif in dif
treatment ALL 7.37 10.69
control ALL 8.85 10.82
First Difference -1.49 -0.13 1.26
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Table 10: Change in the probability of adding a new bank lending relationship for firms
having a single bank lending relationship.
In this table we present the difference in the probability of adding a new bank lending relationship after the
merger between firms that borrowed from only one of the merging banks compared to firms that borrowed
from a single bank that did not merge.
quintile P(1st year) P(2nd year) P(3rd year) P(4th year) P(5th year)
quintile 1 -3.33*** -3.04*** -3.38*** -3.8*** -3.04***
(0.24) (0.29) (0.3) (0.31) (0.32)
quintile 2 -3*** -2.94*** -3.56*** -3.39*** -2.18***
(0.5) (0.58) (0.61) (0.61) (0.62)
quintile 3 -1.58** -0.8 -1.02 -2.12*** -0.99
(0.64) (0.75) (0.79) (0.8) (0.81)
quintile 4 -0.34 1.7** 1.76** 1.13 1.18
(0.68) (0.8) (0.84) (0.86) (0.88)
quintile 5 -0.58 2.75*** 3.1*** 2.75*** 2.09***
(0.6) (0.69) (0.73) (0.75) (0.77)
aggregated -1.77*** -0.47 -0.62** -1.08*** -0.59*
(0.25) (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) (0.32)
Table 11: Effect of the merger on outstanding loans for firms holding one bank lending
relation
This table is similar to table 1.5 because it evaluates the increase in outstanding loans as a result of the
merger. However, unlike table five where clients have two or more bank lending relationships, one of which
is held with the acquired bank, table 11 evaluates firms that have only one bank relationship. To further
understand the effect of the merger on the total loan amount of firms, we also present the effect of the
merger on the loan size of firms that have most of their debt with the acquirer bank (more than 50%).
This table aims to identify potential changes in the policy of the merged bank.
quintile acquirer target either both mainly acquirer
quintile 1 18.86*** -9.98*** 4.44*** -1.16 -11.23
(1.18) (1.36) (0.9) (5.38) (8.42)
quintile 2 9.11*** -15.05*** 2.97** -21.52*** -21.99***
(1.81) (1.86) (1.3) (4.99) (7.4)
quintile 3 -0.79 -16.88*** -8.83*** -19.11*** -19.57***
(2.11) (2.04) (1.47) (4.63) (6.92)
quintile 4 0.3 -15.09*** -7.4*** -16.6*** -27.52***
(2.6) (2.11) (1.67) (4.78) (7.11)
quintile 5 7.42*** -7.39*** 0.01 -13.38*** -18.76***
(2.16) (1.49) (1.31) (4.29) (6.45)
ALL 6.98*** -12.88*** -2.95*** -14.35*** -19.81***
(0.87) (0.87) (0.62) (2.29) (3.45)
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Table 12: Effect of the merger on the default rates of firms holding one bank lending
relationship
In this table we replicate the analysis from table nine, using firms that have only one bank relationship and
therefore do not have overlapped banks. Similarly to table nine, the first group consists of firms holding
bank lending relations with the acquirer, or the acquired bank, while the second group consists of firms
holding relations with banks did not merge. This table provides evidence to identify potential changes in
the policy of the merged bank.
quintile Change in default rates
quintile 1 -0.19
(0.21)
quintile 2 -0.82*
(0.44)
quintile 3 -0.75
(0.58)
quintile 4 -1.31*
(0.68)
quintile 5 -0.98**
(0.49)
ALL -0.81***
(0.17)
N merged 107975
N other banks 72975
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Table 13: Reduction in the size of the loan received from the merged bank. Effect for firms
having 3 or more bank relationships before the merger.
In this table, we study the reduction in the loan size received from the the merged bank by firms having
3 or more bank lending relationships before the merger, and whose number of bank lending relationships
were reduced as a consequence of the merger.
quintile effect after two years effect after three years effect after four years
quintile 1 -18.87*** -30.62*** -39.18***
(5.83) (6.32) (6.51)
quintile 2 -24.96*** -35.92*** -46.2***
(5.29) (5.87) (6.17)
quintile 3 -28.19*** -29.63*** -39.69***
(5) (5.49) (5.95)
quintile 4 -32.61*** -34.97*** -44.12***
(5.27) (5.79) (6.28)
quintile 5 -28.06*** -30.38*** -37.33***
(4.8) (5.34) (5.87)
ALL -26.54*** -32.3*** -41.31***
(2.36) (2.59) (2.75)
N target 3699 3389 3208
N mock target 8050 7387 6918
Table 14: Increase in probability of adding a bank lending relationship after the merger
In this table we estimate a logistic model for the probability of adding a new bank lending relationship
after the merger. The estimations in this table only consider the subs-ample of firms that have sales and
assets information.
variable estimate 2002 estimate 2003 estimate 2004
sales 0.06 0.05 0.63
(0.49) (0.55) (0.55)
assets 0.3 0.42 -0.2
(0.48) (0.54) (0.54)
merged 5.01*** 11.75*** 10.9***
(1.49) (1.68) (1.66)
C 9.36*** 11.5*** 10.96***
(2.8) (3.17) (3.12)
N 2350 2350 2350
adj. R2 0.0045 0.0209 0.0182
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Table 15: Increase in total loan amount as a consecuence of the merger.
In this table we estimate the effect of the merger on the loan size of firms borrowing from both merging
banks, in this estimation we consider the subset of firms that have sales and assets information.
variable estimate
sales -7.3***
(2.39)
assets 7.69***
(2.36)
merged -21.88***
(7.28)
C -69.08***
(13.71)
N 2350
adj. R2 0.007
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Table 16: Summary statistics for the Chilean financial system
In this table I present basic statistics to better understand the differences and similarities between the
aqcuirer, target and banks that did not merge. I also present one column with the value of the variables for
the complete Chilean Financial System. These statistics only include business loans (loans for individual
without economic activity are excluded).
variable ALL system Acquirer Target Control
General Variables
loan mean 11261543 14030149 20683108 14258330
(45733526) (54853299) (62150884) (53945311)
loan p25 687937 1179302 1595038 900637
loan median 2008466 2858728 4522880 2565312
loan p75 5754259 7074747 14331691 7235073
default rate 9.02 11.65 9.92 9.48
prob. Leave def. 30.65 31.02 28.91 32.23
Fraction of firms with N banks
1 bank 46.78 15.9 30.22 33.57
2 banks 33 42.45 35.36 36.6
3 banks 14.1 26.65 21.14 19.42
4 banks 4.51 10.64 8.96 7.3
5 banks 1.61 4.36 4.32 3.11
Loan mean for firms with N banks
1 bank 7254258 9559333 10984656 7010631
(35887575) (45024324) (36754835) (34364521)
2 banks 10305567 8452516 16058292 11203186
(39316109) (35255560) (46593000) (41603014)
3 banks 15888013 13733645 23459279 17729083
(51533623) (49823682) (62763554) (56597966)
4 banks 26626901 24334681 36459658 29324660
(74312072) (74524608) (87145558) (80100817)
5 banks 63614293 61295486 80100486 71450322
(134025980) (133867431) (149210333) (144413050)
Default rate for firms with N banks
1 bank 5.91 5.61 5.85 5.64
2 banks 9.78 9.95 8.87 8.89
3 banks 13.65 14.03 12.73 12.78
4 banks 17.14 17.6 16.17 16.56
5 banks 20.47 21.21 20.15 20.64
Probability of leaving financial distress for firms with N banks
1 bank 26.87 17.44 17.49 23.35
2 banks 34.04 34.19 32.92 37.02
3 banks 33.17 33.75 31.36 35.48
4 banks 29.89 30.22 29.82 30.51
5 banks 25.9 25.63 24.32 25.33
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